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A European contribution to non-proliferation? 
 
The EU WMD Strategy at ten 
 
 
Introduction 
 
2003 was a year of crisis. Major disputes about Saddam Hussein’s alleged weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) programmes and the subsequent US-led invasion of Iraq 
brought about profound ruptures among European states that shook the European Union 
(EU) to the core: ‘...the Iraq crisis exposed serious internal rifts among European 
governments over the future of European integration and the issue of how to deal with 
the United States’.1 However, the deep divisions in the wake of the Iraq War emerged as 
a wake-up call for Europe’s political leaders. They realized that they needed to form a 
consensus on major security issues, in particular the non-proliferation of WMD, if they 
wanted to appear to be a credible international security actor. After all, a new WMD 
crisis had already emerged on the horizon, when an Iranian opposition group leaked 
information about illicit nuclear activities in Iran in summer 2002. Moreover, the events 
of 9/11 and the prospects of mass impact terrorism still loomed uneasily in the 
background. Ultimately, the development of a common non-proliferation policy became 
a new top priority for the EU. In other words, as in the case of the European Security 
and Defence Policy, crisis led to catharsis.2 
In practical terms, the EU adopted a series of policy documents dealing with non-
proliferation, which themselves culminated in December 2003 in the EU strategy 
against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, better known as the EU WMD 
Strategy.3 Even the EU’s new key foreign policy document, the 2003 European Security 
Strategy, emphasized the need to address proliferation challenges urgently. So, just 
months after the invasion of Iraq, the EU was able to identify WMD proliferation as one 
of the five key threats facing Europe and declared that it was in the long-term even 
‘potentially the greatest threat to our security’.4 In the years that followed, European 
policy-makers made considerable efforts to turn the documents’ provisions into an 
accessible common policy worthy of that description. 
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However, assessments of those efforts have varied considerably, both among 
academics, as well as in the think tank community. Whereas some have categorized the 
EU’s emerging non-proliferation policy as one of the EU’s best performing foreign and 
security policy fields, in which the EU largely acts as a ‘normal power’,5 others are 
substantially more sceptical and highlight that ‘the divisions among EU member states 
make it hard to envisage a common EU policy of substance...’. 6  With the tenth 
anniversary of the EU WMD Strategy coming up in December 2013, it is timely to 
revisit the strategy and to assess its implementation by taking stock of the EU non-
proliferation policies over the course of the past decade. 
Yet, how do we know how good the strategy’s implementation is? Overcoming the 
traditional ‘analytical and conceptual anarchy’ in foreign and security policy 
evaluation, 7  this article adopts a straightforward three-stage approach based on the 
emerging concept of ‘performance’ in the context of international organizations and the 
EU.8 First, it puts the WMD Strategy into the context of an international organization 
with the peculiar characteristics of the EU. Second, it analyses the institutional 
structures and financial resources that must be in place before the implementation of the 
WMD Strategy is possible. Third, it examines the extent to which the EU has been able 
to use these structures and resources efficiently to achieve the outcomes contemplated in 
the WMD Strategy. In this regard, it is important to distinguish between different forms 
of outcome, in particular immediate outcomes, such as the implementation of concrete 
non-proliferation projects funded by the EU, and long-term outcomes, relating to more 
fundamental objectives such as the roll-back of a nuclear weapons programme.9 
Overall, this article argues that the EU has performed unexpectedly well, especially 
when its institutional and financial constraints are taken into consideration. The WMD 
Strategy has functioned as an effective catalyst for more intense European collaboration 
in the field of non-proliferation. Most notably, the EU has made substantial 
contributions to the large majority of global non-proliferation institutions through 
numerous pragmatic actions that have strengthened the non-proliferation work of these 
organizations. In other words, it has helped to consolidate the existing international non-
proliferation regime during a time of serious crisis in multilateralism. Through flexible 
institutional arrangements, the EU has even been able to make significant inroads into 
traditional areas of ‘high politics’, in particular in the form of the EU/E3 negotiations 
with Iran about its nuclear programme. However, significant shortcomings remain: 
aside from the habitual intra-EU disputes about priorities and resources, the EU has not 
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been able to produce a ground-breaking, tangible outcome in its external non-
proliferation policies, particularly in highly politicized, as opposed to more technical, 
fields. At the same time, efforts to strengthen internal non-proliferation measures, such 
as harmonising proliferation-specific criminal sanctions within member states, have 
largely taken a back seat over the last ten years. 
 
 
The strategy in broader perspective 
 
The EU WMD Strategy is widely seen as a major point of reference in Europe’s 
common approach to proliferation challenges. For the first time, a single document 
encapsulates what the Union as a whole considers to be the major priorities and 
adequate means in the area. However, the actual significance of the strategy can only be 
assessed if two important dimensions are taken into consideration: the historical context 
and the EU’s peculiar characteristics as an international actor. First, the history of EU 
non-proliferation policies shows how difficult it was in the 1980s and 1990s to take 
even timid steps towards something that might remotely be called a common policy.10 
When the member states of the then European Economic Community established the 
first working group dealing with non-proliferation issues in 1981, even the group’s very 
existence was kept secret.11 It were only the shock waves caused by the events on 9/11 
and the 2003 war in Iraq that led to a comprehensive WMD strategy. From this 
perspective, the importance of a common European document on non-proliferation 
cannot be overstated. 
Second, many analysts tend to examine EU foreign and security policies as if the Union 
were a nation-state. However, despite some state-like characteristics, the EU’s policies 
in areas such as non-proliferation still depend to a large degree on the consensus among 
its member states, in particular those with historical interests in the area such as Britain 
and France, the EU’s two nuclear weapon states, or Ireland and Sweden, traditionally 
firm advocates of nuclear disarmament. As the very existence of a common non-
proliferation strategy indicates, member states have toned down their most radical 
positions over time and in some instances national interests have begun to converge. For 
instance, nowadays all EU member states have ratified all international agreements on 
non-proliferation and have become members of virtually all relevant institutions.12 Yet, 
differing tendencies remain, especially in areas such as nuclear disarmament or the use 
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of nuclear energy. Consequently, any assessment of the WMD Strategy and EU non-
proliferation policies must consider the Union’s unusual institutional arrangements. 
Despite these caveats, the strategy’s most striking feature is certainly its 
comprehensiveness. As a major review report by the British House of Lords concluded, 
the strategy ‘...is indeed very wide-ranging, and we see no significant gaps’.13 It consists 
essentially of three major parts: a European threat assessment, a set of broad measures 
and an innovative ‘living action plan’ that has already been updated several times as 
part of the strategy’s six-monthly progress reports. The threat assessment deals with all 
types of WMD, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as ballistic 
missiles and drones, and considers the use of these weapons by both states and terrorist 
organizations. Its peculiarity is its emphasis on WMD proliferation as a threat not only 
to the EU and its member states, but also more generally to the international non-
proliferation regime as a whole.14 The proposed measures to deal with these threats are 
equally broad. They range from addressing ‘root causes of instability’ to employing, as 
a last resort, the use of force under Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter.15 
The emphasis is, however, on what has been termed ‘effective multilateralism’, the 
promotion of global and regional stability and, to a lesser degree, the cooperation with 
key partner countries, in particular the United States.16 As the concrete measures and 
projects in the action plan make clear, the last category remains fairly vague and 
ambiguous, but stability promotion and ‘effective multilateralism’ – the strategy’s key 
element – are more specific: the former focuses on non-proliferation and disarmament 
assistance programmes in partner countries, while the latter emphasizes the 
universalization of international non-proliferation agreements and the compliance with 
these agreements through verification, enforcement and control mechanisms. In 
comparison with the traditionally more passive stance of other powers such as China 
and with what was at that time a hawkish US approach building on forceful unilateral 
actions and ‘coalitions of the willing’, this active promotion of assistance programmes 
and ‘effective multilateralism’ can be seen as a key ingredient of a decidedly European 
way of dealing with non-proliferation challenges. 
However, it should be pointed out that two important measures have still fallen short: 
nuclear disarmament – which remains a controversial topic – and measures to be taken 
within EU member states. The latter shortcoming was only addressed by the 2008 New 
Lines for Action that complemented the WMD Strategy and re-focused the EU’s 
attention on internal measures such as enhanced export controls, means to fight 
5 
 
proliferation financing, or ‘models for awareness raising for undertakings, scientific and 
academic circles, and financial institutions’.17 Overall, it seems reasonable to argue that, 
under the circumstances, EU member states have been able to agree on a comprehensive 
and relatively concrete document addressing proliferation challenges. Yet, ultimately, a 
strategy is only as good as its implementation. After all, the WMD Strategy might 
simply be an over-ambitious document without practical implications, as Michael 
Clarke suggested: ‘The danger with all of these documents is that the EU looks as if it 
wants to do everything about everything, and we all know it will do very little about 
anything’.18 
 
 
Institutions matter 
 
The EU’s non-proliferation structures have developed silently in the shadow of the 
Union’s military and civilian crisis management missions, which have so far attracted 
most attention from scholars. Before the formal adoption of the EU WMD Strategy, 
Javier Solana, then the EU’s High Representative, had already appointed a personal 
representative for non-proliferation of WMD. In mid-October 2003, Annalisa Giannella, 
an EU career civil servant, assumed office and quickly built up a team of roughly ten 
staff members within the Council of the European Union. Furthermore, the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General for External Relations had at least two staff 
members working specifically on non-proliferation issues in a strict sense.19 In short, 
from very early on the EU acquired the necessary human resources to implement the 
WMD Strategy. 
Institutionally, however, it has been difficult to make full use of them. The Personal 
Representative herself was seen initially as a rather weak choice, because she was not a 
political heavyweight who could successfully push the WMD Strategy agenda through 
the Council and provide a well-known face for the emerging European non-proliferation 
policy. 20  At the same time, inter-institutional relations between Council and 
Commission staff working in the area of non-proliferation have been far from smooth.21 
Originally, the Personal Representative tried to concentrate all non-proliferation 
relevant work in the Council unit, but the Commission was able to maintain its parallel 
structures. This was particularly relevant from a financial perspective, because most 
non-proliferation projects were initially funded as part of the Commission’s regional 
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programmes, in particular the Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (TACIS).22 
After the first few years, however, practical working arrangements were found for most 
of these problems. At the end of 2006, the rather misleadingly named WMD Monitoring 
Centre was launched as an inter-institutional coordination mechanism, through which 
Council and Commission staff were able to exchange relevant information. Although 
internal assessments of the usefulness of the now defunct centre varied substantially,23 it 
is one of the few examples of inter-institutional bridge-building in the area of external 
affairs prior to the Lisbon Treaty. Crucially, the EU has also increasingly underpinned 
the emerging institutional structure with substantial funding to implement the provisions 
of the WMD Strategy. Essentially, there exist two important budget lines: the budget of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) based in the Council and the 
Community budget based in the European Commission. Although the Personal 
Representative had a clear preference for the flexibility of the former, most funding has 
actually come from the latter. Whereas the CFSP budget has dedicated approximately 
125 million euro to non-proliferation activities in the period between 2004 and 2013, 
the Community budget earmarked 300 million euros for long-term non-proliferation 
expenses between 2007 and 2013 alone, when the so-called Instrument for Stability was 
adopted in late 2006.24 Moreover, biannual CFSP spending figures in the field of non-
proliferation have remained relatively stable, even though the overall CFSP budget has 
grown substantially during the last ten years. This means that the relative amount of 
CFSP money spent on non-proliferation has actually decreased over time.25 Even with 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty at the end of 2009 this basic division of EU 
non-proliferation funding between CFSP and Community budgets has hardly changed. 
The Lisbon Treaty was originally regarded as a major game-changer for the EU’s 
foreign and security affairs because it integrated the relevant Commission and Council 
units within the new European External Action Service with Catherine Ashton as the 
new High Representative at the helm. However, the actual results of the transition from 
the pre- to the post-Lisbon structures have been rather mixed, in particular in the field of 
non-proliferation. In terms of external representation, hardly any change can be 
recorded. The EU has basically maintained its pre-Lisbon arrangements with 
international non-proliferation institutions such as the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.26 Internally, the changes have been 
more substantial, but not always for the better. Most notably, when Annalisa Giannella 
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retired a year after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, she left an important 
leadership vacuum that was only filled at the beginning of 2013, when Jacek Bylica, a 
Polish diplomat and the former head of the NATO WMD Non-Proliferation Centre was 
appointed by Catherine Ashton as Principal Adviser and Special Envoy for Non-
proliferation and Disarmament. In fact, more staff members have left or swapped 
responsibilities than might be expected under normal conditions. Even the non-
proliferation unit itself was moved during the continuous restructuring processes within 
the External Action Service. Oddly enough, the final structure has essentially kept the 
old division between Council and Commission alive when it created a unit for WMD, 
conventional weapons and space, but anchored the responsibility for the non-
proliferation programmes of the Instrument for Stability in another unit. 
Although these institutional issues have been present for over three years, it is still 
possible that they merely represent transitional hiccoughs during the infancy of a 
completely new institution. In fact, several positive developments are already 
discernible. In Brussels, the institutional structures of the non-proliferation unit in the 
External Action Service finally appear to be in place. The most promising progress so 
far has been the establishment of permanent chairs for the Council working groups, in 
particular the working group on non-proliferation, where representatives of the member 
states’ non-proliferation units usually meet once a month. This new function allows for 
the replacement of the six-month programmes of the EU’s rotating presidencies with a 
long-term perspective based on the growing expertise in the External Action Service. 
Likewise, Catherine Ashton has integrated the Iran experts of the non-proliferation unit 
in her new strategic planning division, which facilitates the direct and less bureaucratic 
coordination of the High Representative’s negotiations with Iran. In Vienna, the 
upgrade of the small Commission representation to a better staffed EU delegation has 
improved the EU’s ability to coordinate member states’ positions in Vienna-based 
international non-proliferation institutions and increase its outreach to other actors. The 
integration of so-called chefs de file in the delegation also shows how new pragmatic 
arrangements can make a difference without the need for large-scale legal reforms. In 
essence, one of the member states with substantial expertise in a highly technical field 
related to non-proliferation, in particular France and the United Kingdom, now assumes 
a leadership role by making an issue expert available to the EU delegation and the other 
member states. 
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The biggest challenge that remains is the nexus between the EU’s external non-
proliferation policies and the corresponding policy coordination within the EU. The 
main problem is the hybrid nature of the issue at stake, i.e. it covers a wide range of 
overlapping policy fields such as foreign affairs, counter-terrorism, health policy 
regarding biological weapons or trade policy concerning the control of dual-use items.27 
Consequently, the responsibilities for non-proliferation measures – both inside member 
states and the EU itself – are very complex and diffuse and usually include foreign 
affairs, interior and trade ministries or different Directorate-Generals in the European 
Commission.28 In short, no institution exists that may take overall ownership of the 
broad array of potentially common non-proliferation measures within the EU. 
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the internal measures proposed by the New 
Lines for Action, for example proliferation-specific criminal sanctions or better 
cooperation with research institutions and private companies, have not been fully 
implemented. Even in the historically more advanced area of common export controls 
for dual-use items progress has been slow.29 
 
 
EU performance: from process to outcomes 
 
At first, the difficulties with the establishment of functioning institutional structures in 
the EU appeared to vindicate many scholars who, after the adoption of the EU WMD 
Strategy, doubted that the EU policy would go anywhere beyond a simple institution-
building exercise.30 Yet, low expectations did not reflect the reality of concrete EU 
policy outcomes in the long-term. 
 
The rocky road to Tehran 
The most striking omission in the EU WMD Strategy is the specific case of Iran. 
Although the strategy provides general guidance on how to deal with WMD crises, this 
lack of direct reference to the most pervasive nuclear crisis of the last decade is at first 
disconcerting. But given the EU’s deep divisions during the 2002–03 Iraq crisis and its 
unpromising reputation in other high profile cases of WMD proliferation, including 
North Korea and Syria, this omission might actually have been a prudent step. In 
essence, the WMD Strategy provided a useful general policy framework without overly 
constraining the EU and its member states’ response to the emerging Iranian nuclear 
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crisis. In fact, the European approach to Iran turned out to be rather unorthodox. It 
began with a trip to Tehran in October 2003 by the foreign ministers of what became to 
be known as the E3 – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – who stepped into the 
leadership vacuum left by the United States, when it decided not to initiate direct 
negotiations with Iran. Although the first E3 trip did not count with the official support 
from the EU, the E3 were quick to include Javier Solana, the then High Representative 
of the EU, as the lead negotiator and, once the initial E3 format was ‘rectified’,31 the E3 
initiative was officially endorsed by the other EU member states. In other words, the 
new EU/E3 format with Javier Solana as the main linkage between the E3 and the EU 
turned the E3 initiative into an endeavour generally supported by the EU as a whole. 
For the E3, the new arrangement confirmed their leadership role without the need 
constantly to fine-tune their approach with other member states. Moreover, the 
individual influence that the E3 brought about was multiplied by the backing of the 
other EU member states. In the words of the current shadow foreign secretary, ‘the EU 
can be an effective and vital vehicle for amplifying our power such as on Iran where the 
combined voice and action of 27 European States working together can achieve more 
than Britain could achieve alone’.32 The other EU member states, for their part, are 
regularly consulted on Iran and thus enjoy a higher degree of involvement in the Iran 
issue than as non-EU countries.33  Moreover, they have an important say in issues 
affecting them directly such as the imposition of EU-wide sanctions on Iran. Although it 
is not seen as an ideal solution, all member states accept it as a reasonable arrangement 
that is more practical than dealing with Iran as a group of now 28 member states. This 
shows how the EU can find flexible and pragmatic institutional arrangements to deal 
with a high profile case of nuclear proliferation outside the formal provisions of its 
founding treaties. 
Initially, the European initiative bore remarkable fruits: already during their first trip to 
Tehran in October 2003, the E3 reached a first agreement with Iran on its nuclear 
activities. After a series of disagreements in the following months, the EU/E3 and Iran 
negotiated a year later the more comprehensive Paris Agreement. In exchange for 
economic benefits and the negotiation of a long-term agreement, this new agreement 
achieved with hindsight two notable outcomes: first, Iran decided ‘...on a voluntary 
basis, to continue and extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and 
reprocessing activities’; second, it continued with the voluntary implementation of the 
Additional Protocol, which foresees particularly strict nuclear inspections by the 
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IAEA.34 However, these major outcomes were not long-lived.35 With the election of 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president of Iran, the Paris Agreement was doomed to fail. 
The following years have been characterized by a growing confrontation between the 
regime in Tehran and the EU/E3, including several rounds of sanction against Iran.36 
Although in 2006 the EU/E3 were able to integrate the three non-European P5 countries 
(China, Russia and the United States) in the form of the new E3+3 format and the 
negotiations under the leadership of Javier Solana and, since 2009, Catherine Ashton 
have continued until the present day, it is difficult not to concur with the conclusions by 
Javier Solana himself: ‘On balance, it is clear that the end result was not the desired 
one’.37 In short, Iran is now substantially closer to the nuclear threshold than it was at 
the beginning of the negotiations. 
At the same time, however, Iran has not crossed that threshold and Europe’s continuous 
effort to negotiate with the regime in Tehran might have had a role to play. It is also 
important to consider the role of the United States. On the one hand, it is hardly possible 
to solve the Iranian nuclear crisis without an agreement between Iran and the United 
States. After all, the crisis is at heart a long-standing US-Iranian strategic conflict. On 
the other hand, US administrations have been very reluctant to negotiate directly with 
the regime in Tehran. On the contrary, before 2005, the US administration even played 
a rather counter-productive role, when it pursued confrontational policies that were not 
in accord with the EU/E3 approach.38 In this context, the overall balance in what turned 
out to be a particularly difficult undertaking appears to be significantly better:39 First, 
the EU has been able to maintain a broad international coalition for more than ten years. 
Although this outcome should not be over-emphasized, maintaining for such a long time 
the unity of both Europe and the P5 in a high profile case remains a notable 
achievement. Second, the EU’s negotiations have prevented an escalation of the conflict 
and kept the diplomatic channels between Iran and the international community open. 
This will facilitate any future agreement, whenever a new window of opportunity 
emerges, in particular for direct US-Iran negotiations. Finally, the EU has also 
demonstrated that it can take a hard stance in high profile cases such as Iran. Above all, 
the adoption of strict unilateral sanctions outside the UN framework in 2012, including 
an oil embargo, came as a largely unexpected move and earned the respect by those who 
advocate a hard-line approach against Iran. A prominent Israeli commentator went even 
so far as to claim that ‘the European Union went to war against Iran’.40 
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Pragmatic multilateralism 
The EU’s classic strength in international organizations is what Roy Ginsberg called the 
‘politics of scale’,41 i.e. by joining forces member states can have a larger impact as a 
group than as individual states. For example, the EU can currently muster the support of 
28 member states plus a few associated countries, whenever it agrees on an issue and 
attempts to push its agenda in debates in international organizations or during 
international treaty negotiations. Even a moderate Eurosceptic Tory had to concede that 
‘...the EU has much greater clout in such negotiations than any single European state’.42 
Although it can be difficult to trace the actual impact of the EU’s common actions in 
international institutions empirically, the amount of supporting evidence has increased 
since the adoption of the WMD Strategy. An analysis of the most recent review 
conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty shows, for instance, how the EU’s 
peculiar performance could make a difference in the conference negotiations. 43 
Likewise, in the Vienna-based non-proliferation institutions, in particular the IAEA, the 
EU’s balanced common positions have become an important point of reference for other 
countries, especially smaller ones that cannot afford a large staff to deal with non-
proliferation issues such the details of the Iranian nuclear programme.44 In fact, when 
legalistic quibbling about the correct statement headings after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty between Britain and the other member states prevented a common EU 
statement at the 2011 IAEA General Conference, the missing document left a widely 
noted gap.45 
In the wake of the WMD Strategy, the EU has stepped up the common approach to 
international non-proliferation institutions way beyond the traditional ‘politics of scale’. 
Most notably, it has adopted a number of unprecedented measures to support directly 
these institutions. The first step was the inclusion of a so-called non-proliferation clause 
in certain agreements between the EU and partner countries.46 The aim of the clause is 
to strengthen international non-proliferation agreements by both obliging partner 
countries to adhere to the treaties that they have ratified and encouraging them to ratify 
those treaties to which they are not a party. Much like the EU’s traditional human rights 
clauses, the EU reserves the right to suspend a bilateral agreement in case of a major 
violation of the clause. Therefore, the non-proliferation clause introduces the use of 
political conditionality to the EU non-proliferation policy. 
Admittedly, the results of the clause have not been entirely clear: on the one hand, the 
clause has been already included in around 100 contractual relations,47 including with 
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significant countries such as Indonesia or South Korea. Modified versions of the clause 
have also been integrated into the so-called Action Plans with neighbouring countries 
such as Egypt and Israel. In the short term, this has raised at least the awareness of the 
importance of international non-proliferation agreements in a large number of countries. 
In the long-term, it may also strengthen the continued adherence to international non-
proliferation agreements by those states that are already members because the potential 
suspension of a partnership agreement with the EU increases the costs of non-
compliance.48 On the other hand, however, there exists no clear evidence to establish a 
causal link between the non-proliferation clause and new ratifications of relevant 
agreements. In this sense, it has remained a rather weak foreign policy instrument. Most 
notably, virtually none of the more problematic countries that have ratified only, if at 
all, a few non-proliferation agreements have been targeted successfully. The main point 
of criticism in this regard concerns India. In two instances, the EU and its member states 
did not strictly live up to their non-proliferation principles. First, the EU has failed to 
overcome the Indian blockage of the negotiation of a political agreement, which would 
include the non-proliferation clause. Second, in 2008, EU member states did not block a 
special waiver for India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group even though it had negative 
consequences for the non-proliferation regime.49 From the perspective of what could be 
called ‘principled multilateralism’ such behaviour was certainly erratic. However, in 
exceptional circumstances the EU has to take into consideration other strategic issues 
such as commercial relations or the need for economic development, in particular if a 
major global player such as India stubbornly refuses to negotiate anything related to 
non-proliferation.50 In other words, the EU is forced at times to adopt a pragmatic 
attitude and recognize that its pursuit of multilateral non-proliferation principles is not 
always a straightforward affair. 
This pragmatic approach to ‘effective multilateralism’ has been also reflected in another 
key provision of the WMD Strategy: projects to support international organizations and 
agreements. In a sense, these new types of projects honour what Javier Solana called the 
‘obligation of results’51 in the EU’s pursuit of ‘effective multilateralism’. So far, the EU 
has adopted 25 Joint Actions and, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
Council Decisions worth almost 70 million euros.52 They cover virtually all important 
non-proliferation instruments, including the IAEA, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and UN Security Council Resolution 1540, 
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with most funding going to the IAEA, in particular its nuclear security fund. The 
projects also cover two new instruments that have received substantial input from the 
EU and its member states, namely the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation and the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. The 
activities funded as part of the projects vary substantially – from the organization of 
regional workshop to highly technical efforts to improve the capabilities to detect 
nuclear weapon tests. But they all have in common that they are based on the voluntary 
cooperation with other actors and use existing expertise in international organizations 
and, to a much smaller degree, non-governmental organizations, for their 
implementation. Therefore, they build pragmatically on the existing strength of the EU 
as a soft power without creating additional institutional layers. 
Yet, what has the EU achieved with these projects? The Joint Actions and Council 
Decisions have been too technical to buy outright political influence. In the short term, 
most direct influence is limited to the imposition of specific conditions in the projects it 
finances. Moreover, it must be pointed out that other actors, especially in the Global 
South, simply expect the EU as a wealthy entity to spend its money in international 
organizations. Others even dislike the EU’s growing role and question the EU’s good 
relation with organizations such as the IAEA.53 This does not exclude the possibility 
that the EU’s continuous spending will lead in the long-term to more recognition of its 
efforts and, thus, to more influence. In terms of achievements, however, the focus 
should not be on the question of EU influence but on the practical outcomes of the EU 
projects. European officials themselves argue that they use international non-
proliferation organizations such as the IAEA to translate the priorities of the WMD 
Strategy into practice, in particular the universalization of international agreements and 
the verification capabilities of international non-proliferation organizations.54 As recent 
research has shown, it is difficult to pin down the EU’s actual contribution to the 
ratification of non-proliferation agreements by third countries.55 In terms of improved 
verification capabilities, the EU’s actual impact is also difficult to quantify, as the EU’s 
effort is an integrated part of the effort by a wide array of international actors. But it is 
fair to argue that the successful implementation of the EU’s specific verification-related 
projects have contributed to better capabilities of international organizations, most 
notably in the case of the global verification system by the Preparatory Commission of 
the CTBTO and the nuclear security work by the IAEA. 
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Evolving assistance and outreach programmes 
European assistance programmes in non-EU countries already focused on non-
proliferation well before the adoption of the 2003 WMD Strategy and reflected largely 
similar non-proliferation activities supported by member states such as Sweden or the 
United Kingdom. In the 1990s, the European Commission used its TACIS programme 
to finance relevant measures in the former Soviet Union, in particular the re-training of 
former WMD scientists. Likewise, the Council occasionally made funds available 
through the CFSP budget, most notably a 1999 Joint Action to destroy chemical 
weapons and manage adequately weapons plutonium in Russia. In 2002, the European 
Commission pledged 1 billion euros as part of the Global Partnership, a new G8 
initiative to control chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials in 
Russia and beyond. The bulk of EU funding has focused on the safety of nuclear 
installations in the former Soviet Union and is, therefore, not directly linked to non-
proliferation in a strict sense. Nonetheless, the Commission has continued its support 
for the re-training of former WMD scientists as part of the Global Partnership 
commitment and has added new, directly proliferation-relevant projects such as the 
dismantlement of discharged Soviet nuclear submarines. The latest data indicates that 
the EU as a whole has ‘...committed more than EUR 955 million, and spent over EUR 
690 million’ as part of the Global Partnership.56 Although easily sixty per cent of these 
costs are spent on nuclear safety, the total amount spent specifically on non-
proliferation is still substantial. In practical terms, the EU’s funding has also led to 
tangible outcomes such as the destruction of WMD and related items, even though the 
cooperation with Russian partners and the EU’s heavy bureaucratic machinery has not 
always made the implementation of the projects easy.57 
With the adoption of the WMD Strategy, the EU’s commitment to the Global 
Partnership has been reinforced. Furthermore, the focus of the EU’s assistance projects 
began to shift slowly. The first indication was the launch of a series of outreach 
activities in the field of export controls of dual-use items. More specifically, the German 
Office of Economics and Export Controls received an EU mandate to implement several 
programmes in this area in selected partner countries all over the world. The major 
turning point came with the new Instrument for Stability (2007–13), which established 
the fight and protection against WMD as the top priority of its long-term component. In 
practical terms, this means that around 300 million euros have been allocated to projects 
in this area, including additional export control assistance programmes and projects to 
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improve the capacities to fight against CBRN trafficking in areas such as South-East 
Asia or the southern Mediterranean. In 2010, an external evaluation came to the 
conclusion that most of these projects had actually been managed efficiently and with a 
clear orientation towards impact. 
More recently, the focus has been on an entirely new initiative, the so-called EU CBRN 
risk mitigation centres of excellence. The initiative is different from other EU non-
proliferation efforts in a number of ways:58 most notably, it focuses on both weaponized 
and non-weaponized CBRN materials. This broadening of the WMD focus reflects both 
legal concerns that the EU may encroach on member states’ prerogatives in the area of 
WMD and the desire to see WMD proliferation in more holistic terms. Similar 
considerations influence the type of projects that are financed through the centres of 
excellence initiatives: on the one hand, typical proliferation-focused projects are funded, 
for example on best practice transfer or the development of integrated national nuclear 
security systems. But on the other hand, the initiative also supports broader civil 
protection measures against any type of CBRN incident such as capacity-building for 
first responders or national response planning in the case of CBRN accidents. 
Institutionally, these projects will be underpinned by a new network of small regional 
secretariats in partner countries that act as focal points for CBRN risk mitigation efforts. 
This shows how the EU attempts to substitute its historical donor approach to the 
former Soviet Union with a more global approach based on local ownership. 
In practice, however, it has been difficult to turn the initiative into tangible results. The 
first regional secretariats have become operational only very recently. Likewise, the first 
projects beyond the two pilot projects have only been active for a couple of months.59 
This makes any long-term evaluation of the centres of excellence impossible. 
Furthermore, it points both to the initial lack of political support within the EU 
structures and the lack of preparation in the implementing agency, in particular the 
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. But, despite these 
difficulties, the long-term potential of the initiative is still promising: it receives both 
substantial funding and the support from those member states that can expect some of 
this funding for their own non-proliferation experts; the institutional capacities are 
slowly improving; and the use of a UN agency for its implementation guarantees a 
certain degree of legitimacy. 
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Conclusions 
 
The WMD Strategy created considerable momentum in the EU’s fledgling non-
proliferation policy. Since the adoption of the strategy in 2003, the EU has intensified 
substantially its non-proliferation activities. Crucially, its performance has been 
remarkably good at different levels, especially in comparison with the previous two 
decades. As an essential prerequisite, it has gained the necessary institutional and 
financial resources to turn its commitment to non-proliferation into practice. This 
includes not only the establishment of a dedicated non-proliferation unit, but also 
informal structures such as the EU/E3. Although the expectations by pundits ran very 
low in the first few years – with most fearing that the EU would focus once more on 
processes instead of outcomes – the EU has also demonstrated that it can deliver 
practical outcomes in areas as diverse as high-level negotiations with Iran, the 
strengthening of the verification work of international non-proliferation organizations or 
the support of non-proliferation efforts in partner countries. The EU has, therefore, not 
suffered from the classical expectations-capabilities gap, where high expectations are 
not matched by the existing capabilities.60 On the contrary, it has emerged that the 
capabilities have been actually higher than the expectations. Analysts of the EU non-
proliferation policy have to be careful, therefore, not to move the goal posts with the 
benefit of hindsight. 
This does not mean that the EU’s non-proliferation policy has been without 
shortcomings. From the outset, for example, the coordination of non-proliferation 
policies within the EU has been secondary to external non-proliferation policies. 
Likewise, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty led to significant structural 
difficulties in the short term. A closer look at the results reveals also a more nuanced 
picture in terms of outcomes. The EU’s major strength has been in the area of 
immediate outcomes, both in the more technical, low profile programmes in 
international organizations and partner countries and in the negotiations with Iran. 
Notable outcomes in this regard are the successful implementation of concrete non-
proliferation projects funded by the EU or the imposition of unprecedented sanctions 
against Iran. In terms of broader long-term outcomes such as the ratification of major 
non-proliferation agreements or the prevention of acts of proliferation, the EU’s impact 
– and the impact by any other actor for that matter – has been notoriously difficult to 
establish. Likewise, it is more than questionable whether the EU can solve the Iranian 
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conundrum by its own efforts, as long as these efforts are not underpinned by a 
substantial US-Iranian rapprochement. All in all, these problems have turned the EU’s 
non-proliferation policy into a behind-the-scenes exercise with a low degree of 
visibility. 
So, what lessons can be drawn from these results, in particular in view of the upcoming 
financial perspectives for 2014–20? Crucially, the success that the EU has had in its 
non-proliferation policy is very much related to two concepts that are usually not 
associated with its foreign and security policies: institutional flexibility and political 
pragmatism. First, institutional flexibility refers to the EU’s ability to use unforeseen 
institutional formats best suited for a given situation. The most obvious case is the 
EU/E3 arrangement, but the unusual implementation of non-proliferation projects of a 
regional organization by global non-proliferation institutions is also a case in point. In 
other words, simply having more intra-EU coherence and building more formal 
institutions is not always the best way forward. Second, the EU’s commitment to 
pragmatism can be seen within the context of its focus on non-proliferation policies 
shaped by the classic characteristics of a pragmatic actor: ‘...[emphasis on] action, a 
commitment to problem-solving, and opposition to dogma and ideology’. 61 
Interestingly, with this pragmatic approach the EU acts very much in line with what 
experts believe to be the only practical way forward for global non-proliferation policies 
in areas such as nuclear security: ‘Effective multilateral action will depend first and 
foremost on pushing forward existing areas of cooperation, both formal and informal, 
and potentially developing new, albeit modest, initiatives to fill policy gaps as these are 
identified’.62 It is probably too far-fetched to interpret these results as a reflection of an 
emerging security culture in Europe. Yet, they might form the core of a new ‘European 
way’ of dealing with non-proliferation issues based on pragmatic actions in support of 
multilateral principles. 
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